ISSN: 2688-9323

Tax Administration Challenges for Gig Workers in the Digital Platform Economy: An Economic Analysis

Chen Dong

Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing, China

Abstract

The rapid expansion of the digital platform economy has fundamentally disrupted traditional tax administration frameworks. This paper examines the tax compliance challenges confronting gig workers and platform enterprises in China's digital economy, analysing the structural mechanisms through which information costs and incentive distortions undermine effective revenue collection. Drawing on information economics, principal-agent theory, and behavioural economics, we construct a tripartite analytical framework - "information costs → incentive distortions → institutional responses" - to diagnose the systemic dysfunction arising from information asymmetry among tax authorities, platform enterprises, and gig workers. The analysis reveals that platforms strategically withhold transaction data to minimise compliance burdens, while gig workers rationally underreport income given low audit probabilities and behavioural biases such as loss aversion and framing effects. Tax authorities, constrained by resource scarcity, contract their oversight to high-yield targets, producing a self-reinforcing low-compliance equilibrium. To break this institutional lock-in, the paper proposes four policy pathways: establishing a platform-centred data-sharing and co-governance mechanism with mandatory real-time income reporting; developing a gig-specific progressive tax framework with simplified filing procedures and industry-specific deductions; building an intelligent regulatory system integrated with the Golden Tax Phase IV platform; and cultivating a multi-party collaborative tax governance ecosystem. These recommendations aim to restore incentive compatibility across all actors and construct a sustainable tax governance architecture adapted to China's rapidly evolving digital economy.

Keywords

Gig economy; Tax Administration; Information Asymmetry; Incentive Distortion.

1. Research Background and Significance

1.1. Background

The rapid development of the digital platform economy has fundamentally reshaped global labour markets. The gig economy, as an emergent form of employment, relies on internet platforms to facilitate real-time matching and flexible allocation of labour supply and demand. According to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences' 2024 Digital Economy Blue Book, China's flexibly employed population has surpassed 280 million, with platform-based gig workers accounting for more than 35% of that figure, spanning sectors including ride-hailing, food delivery, live-streaming, and crowdsourced design[1]. While this "de-employerisation" model enhances resource allocation efficiency and generates employment opportunities, it simultaneously poses serious challenges to the traditional tax administration framework, which was built around stable employment relationships.

The existing tax system was designed primarily around the stable employment structures of the industrial era, in which withholding mechanisms and employer-administered payroll

ISSN: 2688-9323

deductions served as the cornerstone of revenue collection. However, three defining characteristics of the gig economy have rendered this framework increasingly dysfunctional: income fragmentation (comprising a vast volume of small-value transactions), organisational dissolution of labour (platforms functioning as information intermediaries rather than employers), and the blurring of employment classifications (where the boundary between labour remuneration and business income is unclear). On one hand, gig workers' incomes are highly concealed - multi-platform engagements, cash payments, and personal account receipts make true income difficult to trace. On the other hand, platforms have limited incentive to comprehensively report gig income, motivated by a desire to reduce compliance costs and avoid employer liability. Operating under conditions of severe information asymmetry, tax authorities face simultaneously escalating enforcement costs and declining administrative efficiency. The OECD's 2023 report conservatively estimates the global gig economy tax gap at 40–60%, a challenge that China faces at comparable scale[2].

Existing scholarship has largely examined gig labour relations from legal perspectives, or proposed technical enforcement solutions from a public administration standpoint, without sufficiently unpacking the economic foundations of the problem. The core contradiction lies in the fact that high information costs generate asymmetric information between tax authorities and taxpayers, which in turn produces incentive distortions among three key actors: platforms, gig workers, and tax authorities. Platforms are inclined towards strategic information withholding to avoid liability; gig workers rationally choose non-compliance given low audit probabilities; tax authorities, constrained by limited resources, fall into a "regulatory paradox." This chain of dysfunction reflects a structural mismatch between market mechanisms and institutional rules, demanding systematic analysis through the lens of information economics and mechanism design theory.

China's tax governance is currently at a critical juncture of digital transformation. The "Golden Tax Phase IV" system attempts to bridge information silos through big data integration, yet specialised regulatory rules targeting the gig economy remain underdeveloped. The 2024 State Council Opinion on Promoting the Regulated and Healthy Development of the Platform Economy explicitly calls for "exploring tax service and management measures adapted to new forms of employment." [3]Against this backdrop, clarifying the mechanisms through which information costs and incentive distortions operate - from an economic perspective - carries urgent practical significance for constructing a sustainable tax governance framework.

1.2. Research Significance

Theoretical Significance

This study extends the economic analytical paradigm of tax administration. Conventional tax compliance theory is inadequate for explaining the complex multi-party strategic interactions observed in the platform economy. By integrating information economics, principal-agent theory, and behavioural economics, this paper constructs a tripartite analytical framework - "information costs → incentive distortions → institutional responses" - offering a new paradigm for the study of tax administration in the digital age.

The study also deepens understanding of institutional compatibility in the gig economy. Through analysing the conflicting objective functions and the absence of incentive-compatibility conditions among platforms, gig workers, and tax authorities, it exposes the structural contradictions between the existing tax system and the digital economy, addressing gaps in the literature on the interactions among institutional, technological, and behavioural dimensions.

Policy Significance

Grounded in the principle of minimising information costs, this study proposes actionable policy pathways - including strengthening platform information reporting obligations,

ISSN: 2688-9323

designing incentive-compatible withholding mechanisms, and simplifying gig worker tax filing procedures - to help tax authorities overcome enforcement obstacles. The findings directly inform the revision of the Law on Tax Collection and Administration and the deployment of Golden Tax Phase IV in gig economy contexts. By clarifying platform responsibility boundaries and cost-sharing rules, the research supports a transition from passive compliance to active co-governance, contributes to equitable income distribution, and provides a reference model for the digital transformation of national governance.

2. Theoretical Foundations and Analytical Framework

Analysing tax administration challenges for gig workers in the digital platform economy requires grounding in information economics, principal-agent theory, and behavioural economics. This section systematically reviews the core insights of these frameworks and constructs the tripartite analytical structure of "information costs → incentive distortions → institutional responses," which underpins the subsequent analysis.

2.1. Information Economics

Information economics addresses the pervasive unevenness of information distribution in market transactions and its economic consequences. In the context of gig economy tax administration, information asymmetry constitutes the central problem. Drawing on Akerlof's "market for lemons" framework, when one party cannot observe the other's key information at low cost, markets become susceptible to adverse selection or moral hazard[4]. Tax authorities, as the "buyers" in the tax contract, face significant difficulty in obtaining accurate information about gig workers' true incomes and behavioural motivations - a classic "hidden information" problem. This asymmetry operates along two dimensions: ex ante asymmetry arises from the diversity, fragmentation, and concealment of gig income sources (such as cash transactions), preventing tax authorities from establishing the taxable base in advance; ex post asymmetry manifests in gig workers' ability to "hide actions" through cost inflation and account-splitting strategies, evading audit detection.

A deeper constraint is the substantial increase in transaction costs. As Williamson observed, transaction costs encompass the costs of information search, negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement[5]. In the gig context, search costs rise exponentially due to the sheer volume, frequency, and cross-platform nature of transactions; verification costs reflect the difficulty of confirming the accuracy of self-reported income, particularly when expense documentation is absent or income classification is ambiguous; and monitoring and enforcement costs surge as the target population becomes highly dispersed, rendering the traditional "one inspector per taxpayer" model wholly impracticable across tens of millions of gig workers. Collectively, these costs constitute the fundamental frictions of the enforcement regime - they may even exceed the potential tax revenue at stake, leading tax authorities to rationally scale back oversight.

2.2. Principal-Agent Theory

Gig economy tax administration involves a multi-tiered principal-agent chain: tax authorities (as the original principal) → platform enterprises (as agent and sub-principal) → gig workers (as the ultimate agents). The objective functions of these parties are fundamentally in conflict. Tax authorities seek comprehensive revenue collection, minimised enforcement costs, and social equity; platform enterprises prioritise profit maximisation and are inclined to minimise compliance burdens and preserve their gig labour supply; gig workers focus on maximising post-tax disposable income and occupational flexibility, creating natural incentives to underreport income.

Drawing on Holmstrom and Milgrom's multi-task agency model, platforms occupy a dual role as critical information nodes[6]: they serve simultaneously as the agent through which tax

ISSN: 2688-9323

authorities access data, and as the principal overseeing gig worker behaviour. Yet platforms lack sufficient motivation to fulfil the tax monitoring function: their compliance effort - such as the quality of data submissions - is difficult for tax authorities to observe and verify directly; investment in tax oversight (e.g., developing data interfaces, reviewing worker information) generates no direct returns while increasing operational costs; and strict enforcement may drive gig workers to competing platforms, undermining market share. The platform's optimal strategy is therefore to satisfy only the minimum compliance requirements, or even to strategically withhold sensitive information through algorithmic opacity, creating a liability-shifting paradox.

2.3. Behavioural Economics

The assumption of perfect rationality has significant limitations in the gig tax context; behavioural economics provides a critical complementary lens. Kahneman's prospect theory demonstrates that individual decision-making is anchored to psychological reference points and is characterised by loss aversion[7]. Gig income typically arrives immediately (e.g., daily settlement), while tax obligations are deferred to the annual reconciliation period. This temporal mismatch leads gig workers to mentally account for the full amount received as "gains," while treating subsequent tax payments as additional "losses" - amplifying the subjective tax burden and significantly weakening voluntary compliance.

Framing effects further distort tax behaviour. Platform applications typically display earnings prominently (e.g., "Today's earnings: ¥520") without simultaneously presenting estimated tax liabilities, creating a cognitive anchor of "income equals take-home pay." Embedding a prompt such as "Includes estimated tax of ¥XX" within the income interface could improve tax salience. Furthermore, when tax avoidance techniques circulate freely within gig worker communities and enforcement cases are rare, non-compliance becomes a de facto group norm. Individuals suppress moral discomfort through social conformity, perpetuating a cycle of declining compliance.

2.4. Integrative Framework

Building on these three theoretical perspectives, this paper constructs a tripartite analytical framework of "information costs → incentive distortions → institutional responses." Along the information cost dimension, the distributed structure, data fragmentation, and regulatory lag characteristic of the digital gig economy inflate the costs of obtaining and verifying information, constituting the primary cause of institutional failure. Along the incentive distortion dimension, elevated information costs trigger behavioural distortions among all three actors: tax authorities passively contract their oversight scope; platforms strategically evade information obligations; and gig workers rationally pursue non-compliance given low audit probabilities. Along the institutional response dimension, the reform pathway must simultaneously reduce information costs and correct incentive distortions, ultimately achieving a Nash equilibrium in tax governance. This framework reveals that the fundamental nature of the gig economy tax enforcement problem is a structural conflict between the evolution of market technology and the lagged adaptability of institutions - a conflict requiring institutional redesign through economic tools.

3. Incentive Distortions Under Information Asymmetry

The tax administration challenges of the digital platform economy are, in essence, the result of systematic behavioural deviations from the objectives of tax regulation under conditions of information asymmetry. Drawing on principal-agent theory and behavioural economics, this section examines the incentive distortion mechanisms operating among gig workers, platform

ISSN: 2688-9323

enterprises, and tax authorities, and traces the pathways through which their interactions produce institutional failure.

3.1. Behavioural Decision-Making by Gig Workers

Gig workers' tax compliance decisions are jointly shaped by rational calculation and cognitive biases. Under conventional employment arrangements, withholding mechanisms ensure that taxes are collected before wages are received, allowing workers to form stable expectations about their net income. By contrast, gig economy remuneration is typically paid in full at the point of delivery, with tax obligations deferred to the annual reconciliation period - creating a temporal mismatch in tax salience. This arrangement triggers a mental accounting effect: workers default to treating immediately received income as fully disposable, while later tax payments are perceived as an unexpected loss. Behavioural research consistently demonstrates that individuals are significantly more sensitive to losses than to equivalent gains, and this bias substantially undermines willingness to file voluntarily.

Platform interface design reinforces tax information opacity. Income figures are typically displayed prominently on the application's home screen, while tax-related information is relegated to secondary pages or collapsed menus. This visual hierarchy creates an anchoring effect, leading workers to conflate gross platform earnings with actual take-home pay, and weakening their awareness of tax obligations. At a deeper level, the informal normative environment matters considerably. When tax avoidance techniques circulate widely within gig worker communities and enforcement cases are perceived as isolated incidents, non-compliance becomes a de facto peer norm. High-profile enforcement actions targeting prominent earners are often reinterpreted by the broader community as low-probability events, sometimes generating imitation effects that further erode the legitimacy of formal tax obligations.

3.2. Liability Avoidance Strategies by Platform Enterprises

Platform enterprises occupy a structurally contradictory position within the tax governance system. As the de facto controllers of transaction data, they possess the technical capacity to fulfil information reporting obligations - yet their profit-maximising objective is in fundamental tension with regulatory requirements. Providing unrestricted access to comprehensive data not only entails direct system development costs but also risks exposing compliance vulnerabilities in platform operations, such as fabricated transaction flows or irregular business models. Within a cost-benefit framework, selective disclosure becomes the rational choice: basic identity information is submitted as required, while core transactional data is technically isolated and withheld.

Platforms achieve legal identity flexibility through institutional design. In day-to-day operations, algorithmic scheduling systems effectively exercise managerial functions over the labour process, and service standards are indirectly enforced through rating mechanisms. Yet in formal legal terms, user agreements explicitly classify gig workers as "independent contractors." This arrangement creates a dual standard for attributing responsibility: when platform rights are at stake, the managerial character of the relationship is emphasised; when tax liability is in question, the intermediary character is invoked. Some platforms go further by embedding tax optimisation functions directly into business systems - for instance, automatically recommending account-splitting arrangements or pre-configuring cost deduction options - constructing systematic tax avoidance channels beneath a veneer of technical neutrality.

Policy lobbying constitutes another important platform strategy. Framing their position around employment promotion and economic stability, platforms advocate for regulatory leniency - pushing to raise exemption thresholds beyond realistic levels and to substitute information

ISSN: 2688-9323

reporting for withholding obligations. When local governments offer regulatory privileges in exchange for data cooperation - such as permitting non-standard cost recognition or tolerating irregular settlement practices - the uniformity of the tax system is substantively eroded.

3.3. Adaptive Responses by Tax Authorities

Facing resource constraints and information disadvantages, tax authorities have structurally adjusted their enforcement strategies. The high degree of fragmentation characteristic of the gig economy renders traditional audit models economically unviable at scale. Under conditions of limited administrative resources, enforcement necessarily gravitates toward high-yield targets - such as top-earning live-streamers and institutionally operated studios -while the vast majority of ordinary gig workers drift toward the margins of regulatory coverage. This resource allocation pattern represents a passive adaptation to cost-benefit imperatives, reflecting the systemic inadequacy of the current enforcement regime in addressing new economic forms.

The application of digital governance tools has also generated new equity concerns. Risk assessment models built on platform-reported data exhibit systematic monitoring biases: electronic payment records receive disproportionate attention while cash transactions remain largely undetected; income volatility indices are over-weighted as risk indicators, leading to erroneous targeting of workers with irregular but legitimate earnings patterns. The adoption of digital technologies, while improving efficiency in certain respects, has objectively created a form of enforcement discrimination - workers with weaker digital access bear disproportionately higher compliance burdens.

Local policy experimentation highlights the absence of coherent top-level institutional design. In the absence of nationally unified standards, grassroots tax authorities have adopted differentiated enforcement measures - such as permitting non-standard cost deduction ratios for specific industries or establishing region-specific exemption thresholds. These measures effectively trade tax sovereignty for data access, creating institutional arbitrage opportunities. Gig workers can shift their registered tax residency across jurisdictions to minimise liability, transforming local policy innovation into a competitive instrument of tax base erosion.

3.4. Institutional Lock-In Through Three-Party Interaction

The behavioural patterns of platform enterprises, gig workers, and tax authorities collectively produce a self-reinforcing negative equilibrium. Platforms' data control strategies continuously lower gig workers' perceived risk of detection, normalising non-compliance; growing revenue losses pressure tax authorities to intensify enforcement, but information constraints redirect pressure toward platforms rather than individual workers; platforms respond through lobbying to weaken regulatory standards. As this system converges toward a stable state, three features emerge: tax authority oversight becomes increasingly formal rather than substantive; platform compliance commitments remain superficial; and gig workers' tax obligations are rendered effectively null.

This equilibrium exhibits strong path dependence. Any unilateral departure - intensified spot audits by tax authorities, incremental data transparency improvements by platforms, or voluntary compliance by gig workers - tends to trigger adaptive countermoves by the other actors, ultimately reverting to the original low-efficiency state. Breaking this institutional lock-in requires reconstructing the mechanisms governing information flows and liability allocation, thereby re-establishing the incentive-compatibility conditions that make compliance individually rational. Only by resolving the structural constraint of information asymmetry can the tax governance system achieve genuine compatibility with the forms of the digital economy.

ISSN: 2688-9323

4. Policy Recommendations

4.1. Establishing a Platform-Centred Data-Sharing and Co-Governance Mechanism

Platform enterprises, as critical information hubs in the gig economy, require institutional incentives and obligations to fulfil information reporting and withholding responsibilities. The ongoing revision of the Law on Tax Collection and Administration provides an opportunity to formalise platforms' real-time reporting obligations for gig worker income data, requiring the integration of tax monitoring modules into payment settlement systems to automatically generate electronic vouchers - covering income details and estimated tax liabilities - transmitted simultaneously to tax authorities and to individual gig workers. A direct "platform–tax authority" data channel should be established to enable standardised transmission of comprehensive data, including order flows, payment records, and service trajectories, dismantling the current fragmentation and concealment of information.

A tiered classification-based supervisory model should be adopted: platforms processing more than 500 daily transactions or exceeding ¥5 million in annual transaction volume should be required to deploy blockchain-based data verification systems to ensure tamper-proof records; smaller platforms could operate under a "whitelist plus periodic audit" mechanism to reduce compliance costs. To incentivise active platform participation in governance, a tiered fee reward structure for tax withholding could be designed - when a platform's withholding accuracy rate exceeds 95% for three consecutive quarters, the commission rate could be raised from 3% to 5%, accompanied by enhanced annual tax credit ratings, creating a virtuous cycle of information sharing and compliance incentives.

4.2. Developing a Gig-Specific Tax Policy Framework Balancing Efficiency and Equity

Given the fragmented nature of gig income and the ambiguity of employment relationships, the tax classification framework should be restructured around "business income" as its core category. Drawing on the OECD's Blueprint for Fairer Taxation of the Digital Economy, a specific gig economy exemption threshold should be established[8]: monthly income below ¥10,000 would be tax-exempt; income between ¥10,000 and ¥30,000 would be subject to a 5% progressive rate; income above ¥30,000 would be taxed under existing business income schedules. Deductions for platform service commissions, equipment depreciation, and transportation and communication costs should be explicitly permitted.

A "simplified filing – batch verification" mechanism should be introduced through a dedicated gig worker tax application that automatically aggregates platform-reported income data and generates pre-filled returns, requiring workers only to confirm expense deductions - compressing annual reconciliation to within 15 working days. For gig workers active on three or more platforms simultaneously, a "primary platform consolidation" system should be established, allowing them to designate one platform as the principal reporting entity to prevent double deductions or omissions. Industry-specific cost deduction standards should be developed: for instance, live-streamers might deduct 20% of income for equipment and content creation costs, while food delivery couriers could deduct transport costs of ¥1.20 per kilometre based on app-recorded mileage, improving the precision and equity of the tax framework.

4.3. Building an Intelligent Regulatory and Risk Prevention System Through Digital Technology

The Golden Tax Phase IV system should be deeply integrated with gig economy data to construct an end-to-end intelligent regulatory network spanning data analysis, risk alerting, and targeted enforcement. At the data layer, information from banks, payment institutions, and

ISSN: 2688-9323

platform enterprises should be consolidated to build gig worker identity recognition and income correlation models, automatically aggregating cross-platform income under a single identification number and detecting evasion patterns such as "multiple accounts under one identity" or income splitting. At the algorithmic layer, a gig tax compliance scoring model should be developed, incorporating more than 20 indicators including transaction frequency, income volatility, and historical filing records, with a three-tier response mechanism - "risk alert → interview verification → priority audit" - automatically triggered for high-risk cases scoring below 60.

At the application layer, a "non-contact" audit mode should be introduced: blockchain smart contracts would automatically compare platform-reported data against gig worker filings, triggering system alerts for discrepancy rates exceeding 15%, and enabling tax officers to remotely access transaction logs and electronic records, achieving "frictionless oversight" and "precision enforcement." A gig worker "whitelist-blacklist" credit system should be established: those with three consecutive years of compliant filing would receive incentives such as higher invoice quotas and expedited tax service; those evading taxes in excess of ¥100,000 or subject to two or more audits would be placed on non-compliance lists, publicised on the national credit platform, and restricted from high-value consumption and credit access - creating a durable incentive structure.

4.4. Developing a Multi-Party Collaborative Tax Governance Ecosystem

A four-party co-governance structure - encompassing tax authorities, platform enterprises, industry associations, and gig workers - should be established to break the cycle of information asymmetry and incentive distortion through institutional innovation. A National Gig Economy Tax Governance Committee should be created, incorporating representatives from platforms, tax professionals, and labour associations to participate in policy formulation, with quarterly co-governance plenary sessions to coordinate data-sharing standards and dispute resolution procedures.

Industry associations should develop a voluntary code of conduct for gig economy taxation, requiring member platforms to publicly disclose their tax governance measures and supporting gig workers through tax policy training and compliance guidance. A rapid arbitration mechanism for gig tax disputes should be established within the 12366 tax service hotline, with dedicated gig worker support lines, issuing opinions within seven working days on matters such as income classification and cost deduction eligibility.

Complementary "tax-social security" linkage policies should be introduced, allowing gig workers' tax records to partially offset social insurance contribution bases - reducing pension contribution obligations by up to 30% of tax paid - thereby simultaneously enhancing tax compliance incentives and addressing the social protection gap faced by gig workers.

At the international level, information exchange mechanisms for gig income should be established with countries along the Belt and Road Initiative, and tax treaty frameworks should be leveraged to prevent double taxation for workers engaging in cross-border platform work, providing tax certainty for the globalisation of the digital economy.

5. Conclusion

This paper has examined the tax administration challenges confronting gig workers in China's digital platform economy through the integrated lens of information economics, principal-agent theory, and behavioural economics. By constructing a tripartite analytical framework of "information costs → incentive distortions → institutional responses," the analysis demonstrates that the core dysfunction is not merely a technical enforcement problem but a structural incompatibility between a tax governance architecture designed for stable

ISSN: 2688-9323

industrial-era employment and the distributed, data-opaque, and multi-party nature of platform labour. Information asymmetry is the root cause: it simultaneously generates platform data-withholding strategies, rational non-compliance by gig workers, and resource-constrained enforcement retreat by tax authorities - producing a self-reinforcing low-compliance equilibrium with strong path dependence.

The four policy pathways proposed in this paper - mandatory real-time platform data reporting, a gig-specific progressive tax framework with simplified filing, deep integration of the Golden Tax Phase IV intelligent regulatory system, and a multi-party co-governance ecosystem - are designed in concert to address both dimensions of the problem. Reducing information costs dismantles the structural conditions that make non-compliance individually rational; correcting incentive distortions through tiered rewards, credit mechanisms, and tax-social security linkages re-establishes compatibility among the objective functions of all three actors. Together, these measures aim to shift the system from its current low-efficiency equilibrium toward a new Nash equilibrium in which compliance is incentive-compatible for platforms, gig workers, and tax authorities alike.

Several limitations of this study warrant acknowledgement. The analytical framework is primarily theoretical, and the policy thresholds proposed - such as the ¥10,000 monthly exemption and the 15% discrepancy trigger for smart-contract audits - require empirical calibration through pilot programmes and field data. Furthermore, the behavioural assumptions drawn from prospect theory may vary across gig worker subpopulations differentiated by platform type, income level, and digital literacy, suggesting the need for heterogeneous compliance models in future research. Finally, the rapid pace of platform innovation - including the emergence of AI-mediated labour matching and decentralised autonomous organisations - may introduce new information asymmetry dynamics that lie beyond the scope of the current framework.

Despite these limitations, this study contributes a systematic economic diagnosis of gig economy tax governance and offers a coherent reform pathway grounded in mechanism design principles. As China advances its Golden Tax Phase IV infrastructure and revises the Law on Tax Collection and Administration, the frameworks and recommendations developed here provide timely guidance for policymakers seeking to align institutional rules with the economic realities of the digital age. More broadly, the tripartite analytical model may serve as a transferable template for tax authorities in other emerging economies facing analogous challenges in governing platform labour.

References

[1] Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. (2024). Digital economy blue book 2024. Social Sciences Academic Press.

[2] OECD. (2023). Tax challenges arising from the digitalisation of the economy. OECD Publishing.

[3] State Council of the People's Republic of China. (2024). Opinions on promoting the regulated and healthy development of the platform economy. State Council Document No. 12.

[4] Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for 'lemons': Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488–500.

[5] Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism. Free Press.

[6] Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, 24–52.

[7] Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–291.

[8] OECD. (2021). Tax and the digital economy: A blueprint for a fairer system. OECD Publishing.