Strengthening Supervision of Medical Insurance Funds in Cross-Regional Healthcare: A Study of Guangxi, China
The supervision of medical insurance funds for cross-regional healthcare remains a weak link in healthcare fund oversight and a major challenge in improving cross-regional medical services. To enhance medical insurance fund supervision, this study examines the current status and evolving trends in the regulation of cross-regional healthcare funds in Guangxi. It analyzes the concentration and structural characteristics of medical insurance fund oversight and proposes strategies to accelerate the development of a robust supervision system for cross-regional healthcare funds.Key recommendations include:1)Strengthening medical expense review and payment reforms in regions with significant patient outflows, such as Wuzhou City.2)Enhancing medical record-keeping and monitoring of healthcare practices in regions with high patient inflows, such as Nanning City.
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